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1 Introduction
Many developed countries around the world have been witnessing (and will continue to witness)
a substantial graying of their populations. In the United States, for example, while only 1 out
of 25 individuals was sixty-Þve years or older in 1900, this number rose to 1 out of 8 in 1994, and
is expected to climb to 1 out of 5 by the year 2050.1 The age composition of the work forces in
many countries is also changing rapidly. Labor forces are expected to become signiÞcantly older.
The European Union, for example, will likely see an increase in the share of workers aged 60 years
and older from its 1995 value of 4% to a projected 15.9% in 2030. In many countries, labor force
participation rates of older workers have been declining during the postwar period. In the US in
1950, 46% of men sixty-Þve years and older were active in the labor force, compared to only 16%
in 1993. In France, since 1960, the participation rates among males 55 and older have fallen from
31.5% to 15%. 2The combined eﬀect of these and many other demographic changes is creating an
unprecedented burden on the current younger generations of working individuals.3 Not surprisingly,
the world is starting to see a major reordering of political agendas and the triggering of generational
tensions between those who pay and those who beneÞt. Many governments are responding to this
crisis by introducing policies that increase labor market participation from older workers.4 The
question is, should they? What about the consequences of such policies for eﬃciency in labor
markets? How should labor market policy be designed so that it can accommodate an aging labor
force?
In order to understand some of the underlying inter-generational conßicts, it is imperative to
make an assessment of how the lifecycle may aﬀect aggregate labor market activity. A natural
environment to study this is a model that permits explicit separation of the workforce into young
and old workers.5 Another prerequisite for studying endogenously-evolving patterns of labor mar-
1http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/ageame.pdf
2Gruber and Wise (1999) attribute this drop in labor force participation rates mainly to the amazing generosity
of early retirement schemes (60-70% of previous income) and long-term unemployment insurance programs. Similar
programs with varying degrees of generosity are in place in Germany and Belgium.
3This problem is not unique to the United States. For example, the Commission on Global Aging in its 1999
report mentions that the payroll tax hikes needed to cover the rising costs of public pensions in Europe will add a
cumulative $5 per hour to real manufacturing costs by the mid-2020s.
4In the United States, Social Security regulations in recent years have been altered to encourage later labor force
withdrawal and to increase penalties for early retirement; additionally, age discrimination laws have been extended
to protect workers from mandatory retirement at any age. See Mulligan (2000).
5In related work, Shimer (2001) also studies the implications of population aging for the labor market. In contrast
to our work, all workers in Shimers model are inÞnitely-lived even though in each period a new generation of workers
is born. Young workers are individuals who were born in later periods than old workers and are therefore more
likely to be unemployed since they have had less time to search for jobs in the labor market. See also Davidson,
2
ket activity is a setup in which unemployment can arise as an equilibrium outcome of the actions
taken by independent actors. In this paper, we satisfy both these requirements by embedding
a model of the labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, into an overlapping
generations model with two-period lived agents. The former feature allows for the possibility of
frictional unemployment to arise endogenously: workers search for (and may not Þnd) employment
opportunities in the labor market; similarly, Þrms may also face diﬃculties Þnding workers to Þll
their vacancies.6 The lifecycle of workers explicit in the overlapping-generations setup in conjunc-
tion with the frictions in the labor market therefore produces a natural, rich environment in which
both young and old workers may Þnd themselves competing for the same jobs at the same time. It
is this meeting of the young and the old in the labor market that produces interesting consequences
for both. This paper is really a qualitative study of these consequences. More speciÞcally, we are
interested in exploring the isolated importance of the natural lifecycle in the determination of labor
market participation, remuneration, and lifetime welfare of agents.
A few details of the model setup are in order here. At any date, there are some newly-born
(young) agents and some old agents. All young agents are unemployed to begin with; they will
incur some costs before they may search for employment opportunities. Firms post vacancies also
at a cost and enter the labor market only if there are proÞts to be made from doing so. There is a
standard economy-wide non-discriminating stochastic matching technology that connects vacancies
to people. Once job matches are formed, production takes place. A match survives on to the next
period with a high probability. This is the sense in which jobs are durable. If a worker gets
separated from a match, she becomes a displaced worker, and may re-enter the labor market to
seek employment the following period. At the start of any date, then, all the young workers, all
the displaced workers (who are old), and all the old who did not get matched to jobs when young,
enter the labor market seeking employment. The remaining agents in the economy are the old who
hold jobs that have lasted from the previous period. All new matches produce the same amount of
gross output.7 Firms, however, incur training and re-tooling costs if they hire a young worker or
an old unemployed worker but not if they continue an employment relationship from the previous
Martin, and Matusz (1994).
6There are many competing ways (eﬃciency wages, agency problems, unions, etc.) to generate equilibrium unem-
ployment. To the best of our knowledge, they would all require an explicit distinction (possibly in terms of health,
productivity, desire for leisure etc.) between the young and the old. In contrast, our setup allows us to remain agnos-
tic about those diﬀerences (except for the natural position of agents along the lifecycle) and yet produce equilibrium
unemployment.
7This is the sense in which we abstract away from all diﬀerences between young and old workers and isolate only
their lifecycle diﬀerences.
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period.
We focus on those equilibria in which Þrms enter the labor market up to the point where all
proÞts from entry are exhausted. We begin by providing a set of suﬃcient conditions under which
a stationary equilibrium exists and is unique in this economy. We then proceed to characterize
a steady-state by Þrst examining the eﬀects of increased severity of matching frictions on labor
market outcomes. We Þnd that while these aﬀect young workers wages, they have no eﬀect on
the wages of older workers. Even though matching frictions adversely aﬀect the returns to an
individuals labor market participation, they have ambiguous eﬀects on the age-composition of the
pool of unemployed workers. Increased productivity from job matching produces higher wages
at each stage of the lifecycle, but also shifts the pool of unemployed to younger workers. Higher
training costs lower young workers wages, but have ambiguous eﬀects on wages of older workers.
Unemployed old workers (be they displaced or never before employed) exert standard congestion
externalities on young workers. Also recall that Þrms incur re-tooling costs if they hire an old
unemployed worker but not if they continue an employment relationship from the previous period.
It is precisely because of this reason and the fact that old (young) workers have one (two) period(s)
of working life left, that Þrms care about whether they hire an old or a young worker. This opens up
the possibility that the age composition of the labor force has critical consequences for job creation,
and hence, welfare of all workers. In particular, if there is an abundance of old workers, it becomes
harder for a Þrm to meet a young worker which renders the allocation of workers to jobs ineﬃcient.
It is in this context that government intervention to alter the age-composition of the labor force
may be justiÞed.
We go on to study a setting (the discouraged worker case) where all unemployed, old workers
do not participate in the labor market. This stylized environment is meant to serve as a proxy for
studying the eﬀects of various public policies in the real world (such as social security and generous
old-age unemployment programs) that directly or indirectly discourage older unemployed workers
from participating in the labor market.8 Numerical computations conÞrm the following ßavor of
results. Young workers more readily Þnd jobs in this case than in the benchmark economy. This
happens either because there are overall fewer workers searching for jobs or because there is more
job creation (more Þrms looking for employees). For reasons described above, the lifecycle and hence
8In France, for example, the contrat de solidarite´ recognized the double need to encourage 55-59 year-old
workers to stop work and to bring young workers into the labour market, as rising youth unemployment was a
growing concern to society as a whole. In many countries in Europe, a precondition to receiving unemployment
beneÞts for people over the age of 55 is that they stop seeking employment. See the OECD (1995) study on The
Labor Market and Older Workers.
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the age composition of workers, becomes responsible for an ineﬃcient allocation of workers to jobs
in the labor market. We demonstrate via numerical examples that prohibiting older unemployed
workers from entering the labor force may or may not remove this ineﬃciency. The answer depends
on whether the resultant decongestion eﬀect on young workers is stronger than the eﬀect on overall
job creation. It is our contention that the latter eﬀect has remained largely ignored in popular
discussions of optimal policy design in the wake of an aging labor force.
The rest of the paper is set out in the following manner. In Section 2, we lay out the environment
in which workers and Þrms interact in the labor market. Section 3 focuses on our benchmark case
where all workers actively participate in the labor market. Section 4 studies the discouraged worker
case and discusses the labor market implications of employment policies intended to discourage
labor market participation by older workers. Section 5 discusses how aging may lead to a possible
ineﬃcient allocation of workers to jobs. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section 6 below.
The proofs of all the major results are contained in the appendices.
2 The Environment
We consider an economy consisting of an inÞnite sequence of two-period lived overlapping genera-
tions. Let t be the time index, with t = 0, 1, 2, ... The economy is populated by a continuum of two
types of agents which we refer to as workers and Þrms. There is no growth in the population sizes
of these agents.
2.1 Workers
The principal departure from the standard textbook model of search and matching in the labor
market (as outlined in Pissarides, 2000 or Ljungquist and Sargent, 2001) is that workers in this
model live only for two periods.9 Consequently, in any period, there are two types of workers 
young and old. Each generation of workers is of equal measure, 12 , so that the total population of
workers is equal to 1 each period. At birth, all workers are unemployed. Furthermore, all workers
are risk-neutral and have the same rate of time preference, β. Finally, individuals all have the
same disutility of eﬀort. There are no assets or saving instruments. As such, all income earned is
consumed in that period itself.
9We defend our assumption that workers live only for two periods by appealing to the absolute analytical in-
tractability of a model with long but Þnitely lived agents, and to the fact that the primary purpose of our exercise
is to provide insights of a qualitative nature. To that end, our basic point about the possible ineﬃciency of the
allocation of workers to jobs can be made even in a two-period model.
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2.2 Firms
Below, we will present a partial-equilibrium analysis of an industry in which Þrms produce a ho-
mogeneous consumption good each period using labor as the sole factor of production. Production
is the result of a pairwise matching between one worker and a Þrm. Firms are inÞnitely-lived with
a total population of measure F in each period.10,11 For ease of presentation, we assume that both
workers and Þrms share the same discount factor β. All Þrms are homogeneous in that they all have
the same technology. Firms maximize the present discounted stream of revenues net of all costs.
3 The Benchmark Model
Unlike in the standard neoclassical textbook model, trade in the labor market in this paper is not
coordinated by a Walrasian auctioneer. Instead, we formally model a pairwise, random matching
process between Þrms and workers and a bargaining process between them through which wages
and payoﬀs are determined. The details are spelt out below.
3.1 Timeline
At the beginning of each period, the labor market opens. At that time, unemployed workers choose
whether to search for vacancies or not. If they decide to search, they incur a search cost, s, which
is expressed in terms of disutility of search. That is, we account for a workers loss of leisure time
that must be foregone when making the decision to search for a job. As described in Pissarides
(2001), s represents the imputed value of leisure in terms of output (utility). On the other side
of the market, Þrms make the decision whether to pay some upfront costs (described below) and
enter the labor market to look for employees. Each Þrm may employ at most one worker. Let Ut
(Fv,t) denote the total mass of unemployed workers (unÞlled vacancies) at the start of date t.
Unemployed workers and unÞlled vacancies are brought together via a stochastic matching
technology. Any unemployed (old or young) worker faces a probability αt of getting matched with
a vacancy in period t. Within a period, Þrms and workers have at most one opportunity to meet
and match. At the end of any period, a match formed at the start of that period dissolves (i.e., the
10Assuming that Þrms are owned by coalitions of workers would require modeling the distribution of Þrms at each
point in time. This would involve details that detract from the main focus of the paper  the interaction between the
lifecycle and labor market activity.
11It is important to assume here that Þrms outlive any worker. This lets us sidestep issues that would arise when
an young worker gets matched with an old (soon to die) Þrm.
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employment relationship between a worker and a Þrm ends) with an exogenously given probability
b.12 Once formed, then, matches survive for a minimum length of one period and for a maximum
length of two periods.
At the start of any date t, there are both young and old workers who may choose to participate
in the labor market. All young workers are unemployed at this point. There is no on-the-job search;
hence, old employed workers are not to be found searching in the labor market. The old workers
fall under one of two employment categories, employed or unemployed.13 At the start of date t,
a worker may be unemployed and old either because she did not Þnd a job when she was young
[this happens with probability (1−αt−1)], or she may have gotten separated from her previous job
[this happens with probability αt−1b]. With probability αt−1 (1− b) , she may remain attached to
a match from the previous period. 14
Firms incur costs of posting vacancies, given by a. Upon incurring this cost and searching for
workers, all Þrms are equally likely to Þnd a worker. The probability that a vacancy locates a worker
is θt. The probabilities of meeting a given type of worker (young or old), however, will depend on
the participation of each type
£
uy,t or u
u
o,t
¤
in the labor market. The probability of Þnding a young
unemployed worker is θtuy,t, where uy,t ≡ uy,t
Ut
. Similarly, the probability that a vacancy locates an
unemployed old worker is θtuo,t where uo,t ≡
uuo,t
Ut
which is equal to {(1−αt−1)+αt−1b}2 .
As in Oi (1962), we assume that there are costs which must be incurred at the beginning of
the employment relationship. We refer to these as hiring costs and denote them as h.15 Once
matches are formed, production occurs. Let p denote the exogenously-determined market value of
the Þrms output. Note that the net output from matching varies according to the duration of the
match between a worker and a Þrm. Matches with new hires require the Þrm and the worker to
incur the costs of training so that the net output from new matches is (p−h) while net output from
a match with an old, retained worker is higher and is given by p. In this manner, one may view
h as a cost incurred each time a Þrm makes a new hire or it may simply represent a productivity
12The separation probability is exogenous implying that Þrms here cannot take rational/irrational decisions to
Þre workers at any point. This is a standard device (see Pissarides, 2000) used to capture certain aspects of
real-world labor markets e.g., labor market turnover.
13For future reference, note that the terminology benchmark model refers to the setting where all unemployed
workers, be they old or young or displaced old, search for employment. In Section 4 below, we will study an alternative
setting where all the unemployed old (be they erstwhile displaced or not) are not allowed to participate in the labor
markets.
14The limiting case b = 0 corresponds to the situation where matches last for the entire two periods. In this case,
jobs are perfectly durable.
15As described in Hutchens (1986), these may also be the result of Lazear (1981) contracts.
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diﬀerential between new and old matches. In the latter sense, one may also view h as a parameter
which reßects the importance of Þrm-speciÞc human capital. As in Hutchens (1986), Þrms therefore
have an incentive to hire those workers whose expected future tenure with them is longest.
Finally, the wage rate(s) for the diﬀerent types of workers are then determined in accordance
with the rules of Nash bargaining. At the end of the period, young employed workers learn their
employment status for the following period (i.e., whether their current match survives to the next
period or gets dissolved); at this time, old workers die.
To reiterate, the timing assumptions in our model are as follows. First, the labor market
opens  unemployed workers and Þrms with vacancies look for trading opportunities. Matches are
potentially formed. Second, the labor market closes. Then, production occurs, wages are paid and
agents consume. Finally, young workers learn whether they will retain their jobs when they are old
and the current old generation dies.
3.2 Workers payoﬀs
We go on to compute the ex-ante expected payoﬀs in utility terms to the diﬀerent types of workers.
Recall that young workers begin a period unemployed, while old workers may begin the period
either unemployed or employed. Let Jy,t be the expected lifetime utility of a newborn agent (young
worker) at the start of date t, and wy,t be the wage paid to a young worker in period t. Let J
e
o,t
denote the expected lifetime utility of an old worker who begins period t employed at a Þrm. The
wage paid to an old worker continuing employment is given by weo,t.
16 Finally, let Juo,t denote the
expected lifetime utility of an old worker who begins period t unemployed. The wage paid to an
old unemployed worker is given by wuo,t. All old unemployed workers at t, irrespective of their past
employment status, look identical and earn the same wage wuo,t if they Þnd employment.
The following value functions govern the expected present discounted surplus of workers in each
state:
Jy,t = max
©−s+ αt £wy,t + (1− b)βJeo,t+1 + bβJuo,t+1¤+ (1− αt)βJuo,t+1, 0ª (1)
Jeo,t = max
©
weo,t, 0
ª
(2)
16Recall that workers age is fully observable to everyone. That is, no worker can misstate his/her own age. In
particular, no old worker can claim to be a young worker. As a result, all old workers, whether they were employed
before and then got separated, or whether they did not Þnd employment when young, all get paid the same wage
wuo,t.
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Juo,t = max
©−s+ αtwuo,t, 0ª (3)
These expressions have intuitive interpretations. Consider for example, equation (1). Recall that if
a worker does not seek employment, she does not incur the cost of search and simply gets 0 utility.
If a young worker does seek employment, she must incur s. If she is matched (and this happens
with probability αt) she earns the wage wy,t and may retain the job the following period. If she gets
separated from her job (this happens with probability b), then she will be in the state of being an
unemployed old worker at the start of t+ 1. Alternatively, she may retain the job, and Þnd herself
in the state of being an employed old worker in the following period. If she does not get matched
(this happens with probability (1 − αt), she will Þnd herself in the state of being unemployed at
the start of t+ 1.
We will focus on equilibria where all young workers Þnd it in their best interest to search for
jobs, i.e., Jy,t > 0 will hold. An equilibrium in which every type of unemployed worker will choose
to search is characterized by Jy,t > 0, J
e
o,t > 0 and J
u
o,t > 0. For future reference, note that in a
steady state in which all young workers search,
Jy = −s+ α [wy + (1− b)βweo + bβ (−s+ αwuo )] + (1− α)β (−s+ αwuo ) (4)
holds. Employed old workers always choose to carry on their employment and earn a wage. Un-
employed old workers may or may not choose to work depending on the costs of search.
3.3 Firms payoﬀs
As discussed above, Þrms with unÞlled vacancies must search for unemployed workers to Þll their
vacancies. Firms begin each period in one of two possible states. They may have a vacancy, or
they may be matched with an old worker from a previous employment relationship and will have a
vacancy for sure the following period. Letting Πv,t (Πf,t) be the expected lifetime proÞts of a Þrm
that has an unÞlled (Þlled) vacancy at the beginning of period t, the following Bellman equations
describe the associated expected present discounted proÞts of a Þrm in each state:
Πv,t = −a+ θtuy,t {(p− h−wy,t) + (1− b)βΠf,t+1 + bβΠv,t+1}+
θtuo,t
©
(p− h−wno,t) + βΠv,t+1
ª
+ (1− θt)βΠv,t+1 (5)
Πf,t = (p−weo,t) + βΠv,t+1 (6)
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When a Þrm posts a vacancy, it pays a vacancy-posting cost a.With probability θtuy,t, the Þrm
gets matched with a young worker. In this setting, the Þrm earns net revenues of (p − h − wy,t)
for the period. With probability b, the Þrm will lose the worker as a job separation occurs, and
therefore will begin the following period with an unÞlled vacancy. Otherwise, the Þrm will begin
the following period with a Þlled vacancy and earn expected discounted proÞts of Πf,t+1. With
probability θtuo,t, the Þrm gets matched with an old unemployed worker instead. If that happens,
the Þrm earns current net revenues of (p−h−wuo,t), but will begin the next period with a vacancy
since the old worker will die at the end of the period. If the Þrm Þnds no worker [and this happens
with probability (1 − θt)] then it begins the next period with a vacancy and will earn expected
present discounted proÞts of Πv,t+1. Firms that begin the period with a Þlled vacancy do not pay
the hiring costs and hence earn current net revenues of (p−weo,t); however, they will need to look
for a new worker in the following period. In passing, note that Þrms take uy,t and uo,t as given,
when deciding whether to enter the labor market.17
For future reference, note that in a steady state [using (5) and (6)],
Πv =
−a+ θuy(p− h−wy) + θuy(1− b)β(p−weo) + θuo(p− h−wuo )£
1− θuy(1− b)β2 − θuy(1− b)bβ2 − θuoβ − (1− θ)β
¤ . (7)
Some properties of Πv are worth mentioning here. First, ceteris paribus, increased vacancy costs a
and hiring costs h reduce Πv for obvious reasons. It can also be checked that proÞts increase when
it becomes easier for a Þrm to Þnd a worker. Similarly, proÞts fall when workers wages go up.
3.4 Matching
As discussed above, job creation in this model is the result of a two-sided matching process in which
workers and Þrms engage in search and hiring activities. The details of this process are described
below.
Unemployed workers and unÞlled vacancies are brought together each period through a stochas-
tic matching technology.18 The matching technology describes the total number of matches,
mt = µM(Ut, Fv,t), that are formed at the beginning of each period, depending on the total masses
of unemployed workers and unÞlled vacancies. Since αt represents the probability that an unem-
ployed worker will Þnd any vacancy in period t and θt is the probability that any unÞlled vacancy
17The determination of uy and uo is relegated to Appendix A.
18Recall that Ut is the mass of unemployed workers and Fv,t is the total mass of unÞlled vacancies at the beginning
of period t.
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will Þnd an unemployed worker, it follows that the total number of workers who Þnd employment
(αt · Ut) must equal the total number of Þrms that Þlled their vacancies (θt · Fv,t):
αt · Ut = θt · Fv,t (8)
It is important to note that αt and θt are determined in equilibrium, and that both workers and
Þrms take them as given when making their decisions. Noting that mt = θt · Fv,t, we have
αtUt = θtFv,t = mt = µM(Ut, Fv,t) (9)
the matching condition. As is fairly standard, we assume that the matching technology takes the
Cobb-Douglas form: mt = µ(Ut)
φ(Fv,t)
1−φ where φ ∈ [0, 1). An increase in either the number of
unemployed workers or unÞlled vacancies increases the number of matches each period, but at a
decreasing rate. The extent of lubrication in the labor market is given by µ > 0; ceteris paribus,
more matches occur when µ is higher.
3.5 Bargaining and wage determination
The friction inbuilt into the job-Þrm matching process creates the possibility that a Þrm may remain
unproductive or a worker may remain unemployed in any period. Firms and workers must therefore
weigh the implications of Þnding themselves in these states (their outside options) when bargaining
over their share of current and future surplus produced. In this connection, note that, matches,
once formed, cannot be dissolved instantaneously and costlessly; they survive at least for a period.
19
We now turn to the determination of the wage oﬀer functions for both young and old workers.
Matches between workers and unÞlled vacancies leads to a surplus that is to be divided between
the worker and the Þrm. Nash bargaining dictates that the total match surplus be shared by the
Þrm and the worker; we denote the bargaining weight of the Þrm by λ, and that of the worker by
1 − λ. 20 The net output from a match between a young worker (or old separated worker) and a
Þrm is p−h and that between an old employed worker and a Þrm is p. The surplus generated from
a match similarly depends on age and employment histories of workers involved in the match.
Old workers diﬀer on the basis of past employment histories, which in turn, gets them diﬀerent
wages. Upon Þnding an old displaced worker, a Þrm earns current net revenues of (p−h−wuo,t) and
19One thing to note here is that all wage contracts are of one-period length. That is, even when a match survives
on to the second period, wages are determined by a fresh process of bargaining at the start of the second period.
20All workers have the same bargaining weight.
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expected discounted proÞts, as of period t, of βΠv,t+1 (it will have a vacancy next period for sure).
If the Þrm would not have found a worker in the labor market in period t, it would earn expected
discounted proÞts of βΠv,t+1 as of period t. Thus, the gains from trade for a Þrm upon hiring
an old worker in period t are given by:
¡
p− h−wuo,t + βΠv,t+1
¢ − βΠv,t+1 = p − h − wuo,t.21 The
gains from trade for an old separated worker upon Þnding employment is given by wuo,t. There is
no continuation payoﬀ since the worker will die at the end of the period. The total net production
generated is p−h. The workers wage is therefore wuo,t = λ (p− h) . Using a very similar argument, it
is clear that the wage paid to an old worker from a previous and unbroken employment relationship
is weo,t = λp > w
u
o,t.
The gains from trade accruing to a Þrm from hiring a young worker will typically diﬀer from
that obtained by hiring an old worker. This is because the employment relationship between a
young worker and a Þrm may be sustained for two periods as opposed to just one period with an
old worker. The gains from trade for the Þrm are given by
p− h−wy,t + bβΠv,t+1 + (1− b)βΠf,t+1 − βΠv,t+1
which upon simpliÞcation can be written as
p− h−wy,t + (1− b)β
£
βΠv,t+2 −Πv,t+1 + (p−weo,t+1)
¤
.
The young workers surplus from Þnding employment is given by
wy,t + bβJ
u
o,t+1 + (1− b)βJeo,t+1 − βJuo,t+1
which in turn reduces to
wy,t + (1− b)β
£
weo,t+1 + s− αt+1wuo,t+1
¤
.
Then, Nash bargaining requires
λ
©
wy,t + (1− b)β
£
weo,t+1 + s− αt+1wuo,t+1
¤ª
= (1− λ)©p− h−wy,t + (1− b)β £βΠv,t+2 −Πv,t+1 + (p−weo,t+1)¤ª
Then, the young workers wage function is given by
wy,t = (1− λ) [(p− h) + (1− b)βp] + (1− λ) (1− b)β (βΠv,t+2 −Πv,t+1)−
λ(1− b)βs+ λ(1− b)βαt+1wuo,t+1 − (1− b)βweo,t+1 (10)
21Recall that Þrms are inÞnitely-lived.
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The young workers wage function has nice intuitive properties. Ceteris paribus, the easier it is
for workers to Þnd vacancies (higher α), the higher the wage paid to young workers. This is because
a higher future probability of Þnding a job means a workers option of waiting to Þnd employment
next period has higher expected utility. A higher search cost (s higher) is associated with lower
wages because this lowers the value of waiting to Þnding employment next period. In addition, an
increase in the expected proÞtability of a vacancy next period lowers wy,t since this implies the
Þrm has a higher value of outside opportunities besides the worker with whom the Þrm is currently
matched. Finally, the eﬀects of the job separation rate on the wage function for young workers are
ambiguous. This is because gains from trade to both the worker and the Þrm are lower when jobs
are less durable.
3.6 Stationary equilibria
Henceforth we focus exclusively on time-invariant equilibria. This will allow us to investigate the
properties of long-run equilibria in the labor market. A steady state equilibrium is formally deÞned
below.
Definition A steady-state equilibrium with free entry in the labor market consists of wage
functions w∗y, we∗o , wu∗o , exogenously speciÞed bargaining weights λ and (1−λ) for the Þrm and the
worker, and a quadruple (α∗, θ∗, U∗, F ∗v ) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Nash bargaining;
(ii) (Unrestricted Entry for Þrms): Π∗v = 0 ; and (iii) (Steady-State): α∗U∗ = θ
∗F ∗v = µM(U∗, F ∗v ).
3.6.1 The Steady-State Matching Condition
Recall that the matching condition for the economy is given by:
αtUt = θtFv,t = mt = µ(Ut)
φ(Fv,t)
1−φ
where φ ∈ [0, 1]. Noting that Ut/Fv,t = θt/αt, we may therefore write the steady-state matching
condition as:
θ =
"
µ
(α)φ
# 1
1−φ
(11)
Note that the steady-state matching condition implicitly deÞnes a relationship between αt and θt
consistent with steady-state values for Ut and Fv,t. The SS locus is downward-sloping.
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3.6.2 The Equilibrium Entry Condition
Firms choose to enter the labor market in order to search for an employee and they will continue
to do so until all proÞt opportunities from new jobs are driven to zero. This free-entry condition
dictates that the expected present value of future proÞts attributable to Þlling the marginal vacancy
must equal the cost of vacancy-posting and hiring the next worker. Utilizing the wage functions
described above in conjunction with Π∗v = 0 (from eq. 7), we can get a closed form expression for
equilibrium entry by Þrms denoted by α :
α =
(p− h) + β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+ uo
uy
(p− h)−
µ
a
θ
¶
1
uy (1− λ)
(p− h)λβ (1− b) (12)
The intuition for why the EE locus is upward-sloping is as follows. Ceteris paribus, an increase
in the probability with which a Þrm may Þnd an unemployed worker (i.e., higher θ) encourages
entry because it raises the expected proÞtability of a vacancy. Consequently, in order to keep Þrms
indiﬀerent between entering or not entering the market, the probability with which an unemployed
worker Þnds employment opportunities must go up. This serves to raise (at least) young workers
wages, thereby discouraging Þrm entry.
We summarize our discussion of the SS and EE loci in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1 Given a uo and uy consistent with a steady state equilibrium with unrestricted entry,
the combination of α and θ that make a Þrm indiﬀerent between entering and not entering the labor
market in search of an employee is given by the pair
α =
(p− h) + β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+ uo
uy
(p− h)−
µ
a
θ
¶
1
uy (1− λ)
(p− h)λβ (1− b) , (13)
and
θ =
"
µ
(α)φ
# 1
1−φ
(14)
Figure 1 provides a possible conÞguration of the EE and SS loci with the equilibrium marked
as the pair (α, θ). Table 1 summarizes the comparative static properties of the EE and the SS loci.
The parameters that shift the EE locus alone are p, h, s,β, b,λ, a, uo, uy.
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Parameter EE locus SS locus
a . no eﬀect
p ambiguous no eﬀect
h % no eﬀect
λ % no eﬀect
s % no eﬀect
µ no eﬀect %
b ambiguous no eﬀect
uo % no eﬀect
uy ambiguous no eﬀect
β . no eﬀect
φ no eﬀect %
Table 1: Comparative Statics
3.6.3 Existence and uniqueness
As is clear from (13) and (14), the EE and SS loci are non-linear. Hence, the issue of existence of
an intersection to the two loci is not trivial. The next lemma proposes a set of conditions that are
suﬃcient for the existence and uniqueness of a unique solution to (13) and (14).
Proposition 1 DeÞne
X ≡
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ ,
and
n ≡
µ
a
(p− h)λβ
¶
1
uy (1− λ) (1− b) .
A suﬃcient condition for (13) and (14) to have a unique solution α ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1) is given
by
n+ µ
1
φ < X < 1+ n.
When α ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1) hold, uy ∈ (0, 1) and uo ∈ (0, 1) hold too.
Recall that α and θ were computed holding uy and uo Þxed. That is, Þrms take uy and uo as
given and compute α, the probability with which an unemployed worker will get matched in the
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steady state. In general equilibrium, uy and uo are endogenous [see eqs. (29)-(30) in the appendix].
Proposition 2 below computes the general equilibrium steady state incorporating the values of uy
and uo from eqs. (29)-(30) into (13) and (14).
Proposition 2 A general equilibrium steady state in the baseline case is jointly characterized by
α∗ =
2a
θ∗ (1− λ) − β(1− b)(s+ p)− 2 (p− h)
a(1− b)
θ∗ (1− λ) − (1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h)
, (15)
and
θ∗ =
"
µ
(α∗)φ
# 1
1−φ
. (16)
Suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a valid solution to (15) and (16) are spelt out in the
next lemma:
Lemma 2 A set of suﬃcient conditions for a valid solution [α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and θ∗ ∈ (0, 1)] to (15)
and (16) are µ < 1 and
1
(1− λ)
·
a (1+ b)
β(1− b)(s+ p) + (p− h) (1+ b)(1+ λβ)
¸
> µ
1
1−φ .
Given the non-linearity in (15) and (16), the model does not permit an exact closed-form solution
to (15) and (16) in general. Some progress can be made towards an exact closed form solution in
the case when φ = 0.5.
Lemma 3 Suppose φ = 0.5. Then, (15) and (16) reduce to the quadratic
α2 − α
·
2
1− b +
(λβ + 1) (p− h)µ2 (1− λ)
a
¸
+
µ2 (1− λ)
a
·
(s+ p)β +
2 (p− h)
1− b
¸
= 0.
The only valid solution to this quadratic is given by
α∗1 =
h
2
1−b +
(λβ+1)(p−h)µ2(1−λ)
a
i
−
rh
2
1−b +
(λβ+1)(p−h)µ2(1−λ)
a
i2 − 4µ2(1−λ)h(s+p)β+ 2(p−h)1−b ia
2
.
Then θ∗ may be computed from θ∗ = µ
2
α∗1
.
That is, even though mathematically, there are two solutions to (15) and (16) that are possible,
there is a unique economically-meaningful solution.
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3.7 Age-earnings proÞles
Workers in our model have diﬀerent bargaining positions based purely on their position along the
life-cycle. Lemma 4 computes the wages that diﬀerent workers get as a result.
Lemma 4 In a steady-state equilibrium under free entry,
w∗y = λ (p− h) [1+ (1− λ)β (1− b)α∗]− (1− λ)β (1− b) s (17)
= λ (p− h) + (1− λ)β (1− b)Ju∗o (18)
wu∗o = λ (p− h)
we∗o = λp.
Lemma 4 provides several important insights into the age-earnings proÞles in our model. The
Þrst is that young workers wages are always at least as high as wages of newly-hired old workers
since w∗y−wu∗o = (1−λ)β (1− b)Ju∗o ≥ 0. That is, old displaced workers suﬀer earnings losses.22 In
our model, these can be attributed to diﬀerences in bargaining power at each stage of the lifecycle.
Young workers who make job contacts have the outside option of job search in the following period,
an option unavailable to old workers. Thus, younger workers may earn beyond their share of their
current marginal product, but older workers cannot.
This leads to an ambiguity in the slope of an individuals age-earnings proÞle. Although young
workers wages are higher than the wages of newly-hired old workers, it is possible that they are
higher than wages of old, retained workers. The model can also generate a more conventional
upward sloping age-earnings proÞle. The intuition is as follows. While the ability to search for
employment later introduces the possibility that a young worker will obtain more than her current
share of output from matching, it is also clear that future job search is costly to such a worker.
Thus, higher search costs tend to reduce her outside option in bargaining over wages. In sum,
higher search costs tend to reduce young workers wages, but generally tend to not have eﬀects on
older workers wages since older workers do not have the ability to search for jobs in the future.
3.8 Numerical Experiments in the Benchmark Model
It is instructive to classify the main parameters in the benchmark model into four sets, those
aﬀecting (i) the durability of jobs (b, the rate of job destruction), (ii) search/matching frictions (s,
22Earnings losses by displaced workers are discussed in Jacobson et. al. (1993), and more recently, Rodriquez and
Zavodny (2000).
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µ, a, and φ), (iii) matching productivity (p and h), and (iv) bargaining conditions (the Þrms share
of the surplus, λ). We begin by producing a baseline example.
Example 1 Let the parameters of the economy be as follows: β = 0.9, s = 0.05, a = 0.2, µ = 0.4,
φ = 0.5, b = 0.3, p = 1, h = 0.3, and λ = 0.5. Then, it can be easily checked that (15) and (16) have
an unique economically-meaningful solution given by (α∗, θ∗) = (0.413, 0.387) . At this equilibrium,
w∗y = 0.380, wu∗o = 0.350, we∗o = 0.5, Jy = 0.298, Juo = 0.0947, u∗y = 0.585, u∗o = 0.415, F ∗v = .913,
F ∗f = 0.145, F
∗ = 1.06.
Starting from the above benchmark set of parameters, we vary each parameter in isolation so
as to gain some insight into the eﬀect of each factor on aggregate labor market outcomes. It is
important to distinguish between the direct eﬀects of each parameter from their indirect eﬀects.
Direct eﬀects capture the impact of each parameter taking the steady-state probability of Þnding
a vacancy (α∗) as given; indirect eﬀects include the impact indirectly through its inßuence on α∗.
In many cases (not all), these two eﬀects act in the same qualitative direction. In each numerical
example that we consider, the direct eﬀects are dominant.
3.8.1 Job durability
We begin by Þrst describing how an increase in the rate of job destruction (lower durability of
employment) aﬀects labor market activity. For given wages, a higher rate of job separation (b
higher) lowers the expected proÞtability of a Þrm (hence discouraging Þrm entry) because it must
incur the costs of Þnding workers again in the following period. Since there are fewer Þrms searching
for the given population of workers, the probability of any worker Þnding a job is lower (α∗ lower)
and the probability of Þrms Þnding unemployed workers is higher (θ∗ higher).
What is the impact of a higher rate on job separation on young workers wages? First, a higher
rate of job destruction aﬀects the likelihood that workers will be unemployed again in the future.
They are more likely to have to search for a job again when old. In addition, since the higher
rate of job destruction lowers the probability of Þnding a job, the expected returns from searching
for a job in the following period are also lower. This lowers a young workers outside option when
bargaining with the Þrm and therefore young workers wages. Consequently, the higher rate of job
destruction lowers the expected lifetime utility of young workers. However, it has no eﬀect on the
lifetime utility of employed older workers. The indirect negative eﬀect of the job destruction rate on
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the probability of matching in the labor market lowers the expected lifetime utility of unemployed
old workers.
Finally, the higher rate of job destruction shifts the age-composition of the unemployed towards
old workers. This is primarily because Þnding a job in the current period is less likely to translate
into a young worker remaining employed when old.
3.8.2 Search and matching frictions
We next turn to a discussion of the eﬀects of changing various parameters relating to matching
frictions in our economy.
Vacancy posting costs Higher vacancy costs have eﬀects similar to higher rates of job destruc-
tion. Higher vacancy costs reduce Þrms expected proÞts from posting vacancies, implying that
fewer Þrms will enter the market. Consequently, workers will face more diﬃculties Þnding jobs (α∗
lower) and Þrms will be more likely to Þll their vacancies (θ∗ higher). Otherwise, all the eﬀects
of higher vacancy costs are qualitatively the same as the higher rate of job destruction with the
exception of the age-composition of the unemployed. In contrast to the eﬀects of higher job de-
struction, economies with higher vacancy costs will have a higher proportion of unemployed young
workers. This happens because vacancy costs aﬀect the overall demand for labor whereas the
job destruction rate aﬀects only the probability of retaining a job once employed.
Matching frictions An overall reduction in the economys matching frictions (higher µ) has the
same eﬀect as a reduction in the costs of posting vacancies except for the age-composition of the
unemployed. A reduction in matching frictions implies that all workers are more likely to Þnd jobs.
Hence, the mass of unemployed old workers is lower which shifts the unemployment pool towards
a higher proportion of young workers.
Elasticity of matching technology We can also discuss the eﬀects of an increase in the elas-
ticity of the matching technology with respect to the mass of unemployed workers (a higher value
of φ). To understand the eﬀects of φ, it is important to Þrst consider a limiting case where φ = 1.
In this case, the total number of matches is Þxed and independent of the number of vacancies.
The congestion problem arising from an increase in the number of vacancies is most severe. It
follows that an increase in φ is associated with a lower number of matches (for a given number of
vacancies created); consequently, Þrms face more diﬃculties Þnding workers to Þll their vacancies.
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As a result, fewer Þrms enter the market and so α∗ will be lower and θ∗ will be higher. The eﬀects
of φ on the remaining endogenous variables follow from its eﬀects on α∗ and θ∗.
Worker search costs As discussed above, the costs of search only aﬀects the wages of young
workers since old workers do not have the outside option of searching for jobs in a later period.
Since the direct eﬀect of higher search costs is a reduction in young workers wages, this raises the
expected proÞtability for Þrms from posting vacancies. Consequently, more Þrms choose to enter
the market thereby raising the probability that workers will Þnd jobs and lowering the likelihood
that vacancies get Þlled. Since workers are more likely to Þnd jobs and some workers will retain
them (b < 1), economies with higher search costs will have relatively younger pools of unemployed
workers.
3.8.3 Match output
We now turn to studying the eﬀects of the productivity of matches. Matches may be more produc-
tive either from an increase in the value of the Þrms output p, or from a reduction in hiring costs,
h. An increase in the productivity of matching through either possibility is associated with higher
probabilities of matching for workers and a lower probability of Þlling a vacancy since more Þrms
enter the market. Although an increase in p is associated with higher wages for all workers, the
change in training costs only aﬀects wages in matches for new hires, w∗y and wu∗o . This is because
training costs are sunk from the perspective of matches between Þrms and retained employees.
Either increase in the productivity of matches leads to an increase in u∗y.
3.8.4 Bargaining power
We conclude with a discussion of the eﬀects of an increase in workers bargaining power, 1 − λ.
In this case, the direct and indirect eﬀects of an increase in 1 − λ counteract. On the one hand,
an increase in bargaining power gives workers a bigger share of the surplus when matched; on the
other hand it lowers workers wages because less Þrms decide to post vacancies and workers are less
likely to Þnd matches (α∗ lower). Thus, an increase in workers bargaining power has ambiguous
eﬀects on their expected lifetime utility. Unemployed workers (both young and old) obtain lower
expected utility when 1− λ is higher because it is more diﬃcult for them to Þnd jobs while older
workers who have retained their jobs from the previous period are better oﬀ.
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4 The Discouraged Worker Case
We go on to study a setting (the discouraged worker case) where all unemployed, old workers
do not participate in the labor market. This stylized environment is meant to serve as a proxy
for studying the eﬀects of various public policies in the real world (such as social security and
generous old-age unemployment programs) that directly or indirectly discourage older unemployed
workers from participating in the labor market. In France, for example, the contrat de solidarite´
recognized the double need to encourage 55-59 year-old workers to stop work and to bring young
workers into the labour market, as rising youth unemployment was a growing concern to society
as a whole. In many countries in Europe, a precondition to receiving unemployment beneÞts for
people over the age of 55 is that they stop seeking employment. In this section, we focus on the
labor market consequences of such policies.
We now reformulate our benchmark model to analyze some of the aggregate labor market
outcomes associated with diﬀering degrees of labor market participation according to age. In
contrast to Section 3, we assume that old workers who are unemployed do not search for jobs. For
ease of comparison, we focus solely on stationary equilibria. The details are sketched below.
Using the same notation as in Section 3, the returns to search for workers in each state are
given by
Jy = max {−s+ α [wy + (1− b)βJeo + bβJuo ] + (1− α)βJuo , 0} (19)
Jeo = max {weo, 0} (20)
and,
Juo = 0. (21)
It is easy to see that (4) is replaced by
Jy = −s+ α [wy + (1− b)βweo] (22)
Firms face the same problem as before except that there are no old unemployed workers they can
match with. Accordingly,
Πv =
−a+ θuy(p− h−wy) + θuy(1− b)β(p−weo)£
1− θuy(1− b)β2 − θuy(1− b)bβ2 − (1− θ)β
¤
continues to hold. For future reference, note that since uy = 1,
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Πv =
−a+ θ(p− h−wy) + θ(1− b)β(p−weo)£
1− θ(1− b)β2 − θ(1− b)bβ2 − (1− θ)β¤ . (23)
An old employed worker will earn weo = λp just as before. A young workers surplus from Þnding
employment is now given by
wy + (1− b)βJeo = wy + (1− b)βweo = wy + (1− b)βλp
while a Þrms surplus from a match with a worker is (as before) given by p− h−wy + bβΠv +(1−
b)βΠf − βΠv. Nash bargaining implies
wy = λ (p− h)− λβ(1− b)(1− β)Πv + (1− λ)(1− b)βλp− (1− λ)(1− b)βλp (24)
= λ (p− h)− λβ(1− b)(1− β)Πv (25)
Under free entry, Πv = 0 holds and hence (24) implies
wy = λ (p− h) . (26)
That is, a young workers wage is simply equal to her share of the one-period match surplus. The
fact that old workers do not search for jobs eﬀectively eliminates the outside options available to
young workers, unlike the situation in (10).
Under free entry, Πv = 0, and hence [from (23)]
a = θuy(p− h−wy) + θuy(1− b)β(p−weo)
holds. Using (26) and weo = λp, it follows that
a
θ
1
uy
= (1− λ) (p− h) + (1− λ) (1− b)βp.
Analogous to (13) and (14), we now have
θ =
a
uy (1− λ) [p− h+ (1− b)βp] (27)
and
α =
µ
µ
θ1−φ
¶ 1
φ
. (28)
It follows from (27) that is α and θ are independent of each other [unlike (13) and (14)]. This is to
be expected since workers (by assumption) do not have any outside options to use when bargaining
over their wages  so, α does not enter the wage equation and therefore Þrms incentives to enter
the market.
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4.1 Comparison with the Benchmark Model
The table below documents values of various endogenous variables of interest computed for both
the baseline and the discouraged worker case, using the same set of parameters as in Example 1
from Section 3.
Variable benchmark discouraged
α 0.413 0.532
θ 0.387 0.301
uy 0.585 1
uo 0.415 0
wy 0.380 0.350
wuo 0.350 NA
weo 0.500 0.500
Jy 0.298 0.304
Juo 0.0947 0
Jeo 0.500 0.500
F 1.06 1.07
Ff 0.145 0.186
Fv 0.913 0.885
Table 2: Comparison with the Benchmark Model
It is clear that the lack of labor market participation by the old has a signiÞcant impact on
aggregate labor market outcomes. First, young workers more readily Þnd jobs in the discouraged
worker case than in the benchmark economy. This happens because there may be fewer workers
searching for jobs, and in some cases, there is more Þrm entry. More Þrms may choose to post
vacancies in the discouraged worker economy because all matches have higher durability. We Þnd
that this is the case when the separation probability is low, hiring costs are high, and the workers
cost of search is low. If there are signiÞcant costs in starting new hires, the proÞtability from
matching with new hires is low. In these cases, Þrms earn higher expected proÞts when old workers
do not search for jobs.
23
5 Aging, Unemployment, and Welfare
We conclude by asking the following question: within the context of our model, would it beneÞt
society in the aggregate if all the old unemployed workers stayed out of the labor market? On
the face of it, the answer seems obvious. An additional old worker that searches and Þnds a job
adds to societys total output. At the same time, such a worker increases aggregate search costs
(because she herself searches). Simple logic would then suggest that if the workers addition to
societys output (net of search cost) is positive, it is a good idea for the old to seek employment.
At the societal level, however, there are additional costs that accrue when the old compete with
the young for jobs. By increasing congestion in the labor market, old workers reduce the possibility
that a young worker will Þnd a job. Why is this welfare-reducing? Recall that a young worker who
Þnds a job will hold the same job with high probability for two periods while an old worker will
hold the job for at most a period. This means that Þrms will incur less vacancy costs if they Þnd
younger workers. These costs can be especially important since all workers produce the same gross
output in a match. However, increased durability of jobs can also be a mixed blessing. There will
be fewer vacancies left to Þll for the next generation; furthermore, tighter labor market conditions
may reduce future Þrm entry. On net, it is therefore not transparent if policies that keep the old
displaced and/or unemployed workers out of the labor market are necessarily welfare-improving.
Because we are concerned with the equilibrium eﬀects of labor market participation or non-
participation by old and unemployed workers, we chose as our welfare criterion, a population-based
average of expected lifetime utility for each group of workers . In terms of our earlier notation, this
measure of social welfare is given by:
W ≡ 1
2
Jy +
1
2
α(1− b)Jeo +
1
2
[(1− α) + αb]Juo .
The results of our numerical exercises are summarized in Table 3 below. Our benchmark set of
parameters is the same as in Example 1 from Section 4. Again, we change one variable at a time,
keeping all others Þxed.
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Variable Welfare (Benchmark) Welfare (Discouraged Worker Case)
b = 0.25 0.266 0.267
b = 0.30 0.249 0.245
b = 0.35 0.232 0.223
s = 0.0 0.303 0.270
s = 0.05 0.249 0.245
s = 0.10 0.195 0.220
a = 0.191 0.262 0.258
a = 0.20 0.249 0.245
a = 0.250 0.191 0.191
µ = 0.35 0.181 0.182
µ = 0.40 0.249 0.245
µ = 0.42 0.278 0.273
φ = 0.45 0.251 0.263
φ = 0.50 0.249 0.245
λ = 0.48 0.248 0.245
λ = 0.50 0.249 0.245
λ = 0.55 0.247 0.242
h = 0.25 0.274 0.262
h = 0.30 0.249 0.245
h = 0.35 0.224 0.228
p = 0.95 0.213 0.214
p = 1.00 0.249 0.245
p = 1.05 0.279 0.271
Table 3: Welfare Comparison
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The numerical results in Table 3 provide insight into the possible welfare eﬀects of policies that
discourage labor market participation by older workers. We Þnd that net welfare eﬀects involve
the following trade-oﬀ: labor market participation by the old increases the amount of employment,
but the allocation of jobs shifts towards workers with lower expected job tenures. The net welfare
eﬀects involve one or more of the following aspects of the labor market: (i) the durability of jobs,
(ii) search/matching frictions, (iii) match productivity, and (iv) bargaining conditions.
Given our numerical results from Table 3, we can attempt to understand if policies that dis-
courage labor market participation have welfare-improving eﬀects. Although we illustrate that
the lifecycle may lead to an ineﬃcient allocation of workers to jobs, our numerical results sug-
gest that policies which explicitly discourage labor market participation by older workers may be
unwarranted. In many cases, we Þnd that there is little or no gain from such policies. No-
table exceptions are economies with higher search costs and costs of new hires (alternatively, more
Þrm-speciÞc human capital accumulation).
6 Concluding Remarks
Many countries have recently started to confront the consequences of an aging population. This
poses numerous problems for public pension programs, many of which signiÞcantly impact the
labor market because they encourage retirement. In response to the increasing Þnancial burdens
of ever-expanding pension programs, governments have begun seeking ways to promote more labor
market participation by older workers. This raises some important questions about the impact
and desirability of these policies on aggregate labor market outcomes. As a Þrst step towards
addressing these issues, this paper studies the implications of aging for labor market behavior by
constructing a lifecycle model with costly search and matching in the labor market. In addition
to the congestion problems associated with increased labor market participation by older workers,
we illustrate that aging may lead to an ineﬃcient allocation of workers to jobs since young workers
have longer expected job tenures than older workers and because Þrms economize on hiring costs
when they retain a worker for two periods. Despite this possibility for labor market ineﬃciency, it
is not clear that policies aimed at encouraging retirement are welfare-improving.
It is important to note here that satisfaction of the standard Hosios (1990) condition does
not guarantee eﬃciency in our model only because there are workers of diﬀerent types (old and
employed, old and never before employed, and old and displaced) and they all have the same
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bargaining weight. We conjecture that allowing workers of diﬀerent types to have diﬀerent bar-
gaining weights may eliminate the ineﬃciency. Indirectly, our present analysis suggests that, in
some cases, eﬃciency may be somewhat restored within our setup by prohibiting older unemployed
workers from participating in the labor market thereby allowing us to be perfectly agnostic as to
the weights of diﬀerent worker types in wage bargaining.
In passing, also note that the current structure does not directly yield any insights into the
desirability (or lack thereof) of age-discrimination laws. Age discrimination, according to Cain
(1986), is deÞned as lesser opportunities for older workers that do not reßect lower productivity.
In the model, Þrms cannot restrict or direct their search only to young workers. Additionally, the
matching technology is non-discriminating as far as age is concerned. The model does however
produce equilibria where aggregate worker welfare may be higher when the older unemployed
workers do not search. In this sense, if all workers collectively agree on some form of government
intervention that eﬀectively mimics employer age-discrimination, their welfare as a group could go
up under certain circumstances.
Our current endeavour is incomplete. In order to draw further insights into these issues, we
intend to extend the current model to explicitly introduce various aspects of age-speciÞc public
policies into our framework. In Bhattacharya and Reed (2001), we introduce endogenously funded
old-age public pension programs and a variety of other policies which relate to aging and labor
market behavior. Furthermore, an additional aspect of aging is that older workers may have a
higher value of leisure time or a higher disutility cost of working than younger workers. In related
research, Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (2001) study this issue and ask if this provides a
rationale for public pension programs to induce retirement. Although it is possible that public
retirement programs can improve the allocation of workers to jobs in the labor market, they Þnd
that countries pay their elderly substantially more than labor market search theory implies their
jobs are worth.
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Appendix
A Steady state measures for workers and Þrms in the baseline
model
Below, we compute the steady-state measures of active Þrms and workers that are interacting in
the labor market. To that end, it is instructive to collect all the notation in one place. Denote by
 uuo,t ≡ mass of unemployed old workers at date t who did not Þnd jobs at date t− 1
 uso,t ≡ mass of unemployed old workers at date t who got separated from their jobs at date
t− 1
 eo,t ≡ mass of agents who found employment at date t − 1 and are employed at the start of
date t
 uy,t ≡ mass of young newborn (unemployed) agents at date t (uy,t = 12 by assumption)
 Ut ≡ mass of unemployed workers at the start of date t
 uy,t ≡ uy,t
Ut
is the probability that a given unemployed worker is young
 uo,t ≡
uuo,t + u
s
o,t
Ut
is the probability that a given unemployed worker is old
Also recall that
 αt ≡ probability that any unemployed worker Þnds a vacancy
 θt ≡ probability that any vacancy (Þrm) Þnds an unemployed worker
 bt ≡ probability that any employed worker gets separated from his job
Then, it follows that
Ut ≡ uuo,t + uso,t + uy,t,
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eo,t ≡ α(1− b)uy,t,
uuo,t + u
s
o,t + eo,t =
1
2
,
and the ßow into unemployment must satisfy
Ut+1 = (1− α)uy,t + αbuy,t + uy,t+1
In a steady state then, it follows that
uso =
αb
2
uuo =
(1− α)
2
U =
(1− α)
2
+
αb
2
+
1
2
=
2− α(1− b)
2
uy =
1
2− α(1− b) (29)
uo =
1− α(1− b)
2− α(1− b) (30)
Firms take uy and uo as given when making their entry decisions.
We now proceed to compute the masses of Þrms with and without a vacancy. Let Ft ≡ total
mass of Þrms in existence at the start of date t, Fv,t ≡ total mass of Þrms with a vacancy at start
of date t, and Ff,t ≡ total mass of Þrms with a Þlled vacancy at start of date t.
If a Þrm has a vacancy at t, it can Þnd itself in one of three possible situations at t+ 1. First,
a) it does not Þnd a worker at t and hence will have a vacancy at t + 1, or b) it Þnds a young
worker this period; this worker gets separated with probability bt in which case the Þrm will have a
vacancy next period, or the worker does not get separated [with probability (1− bt)] in which case
the Þrm will not have a vacancy at t+1, and c) it Þnds an old worker this period in which case the
Þrm will deÞnitely have a vacancy at t+ 1. Then, it follows that the ßow into Fv,t+1 is given by
Fv,t+1 = Ff,t + (1− θ)Fv,t + θuy,tbFv,t + θuo,tFv,t
while the ßow into Ff,t+1 is given by
Ff,t+1 = θuy,t(1− b)Fv,t.
Accounting restrictions require that
Fv,t + Ff,t = Ft
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hold. It can be easily shown that the steady state masses of Þrms are as follows:
F =
α
2
·
2− α(1− b)
θ
+ (1− b)
¸
Fv =
α
2θ
[2− α(1− b)]
Ff =
α(1− b)
2
where Ff = e has to hold.
B Steady state measures in the discouraged worker case
Since only the young are assumed to actively search, the mass of unemployed agents is 12 . The
measure of old, employed agents is 12α(1− b). For Þrms, as before, the ßow of vacancies into period
t+ 1 is given by:
Fv,t+1 = Ff,t + (1− θ)Fv,t + θbFv,t
The ßow of Þlled vacancies into period t+ 1 is given by:
Ff,t+1 = θ(1− b)Fv,t
Accounting restrictions require
Fv,t + Ff,t = Ft
Imposing steady state on the above three equations provides a system of 3 equations in 3 unknowns:
Fv, Ff , and F from where it follows that
Ff =
1
2
α(1− b) F ∗v =
1
2
(
α
θ
) z = 1
2
α{(1− b) + 1
θ
} (31)
C Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that
α =
(p− h) + β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+ uouy (p− h)−
¡
a
θ
¢
1
uy(1−λ)
(p− h)λβ (1− b)
which upon rearrangement reduces to
α =
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)− ¡aθ ¢ 1uy(1−λ)(1−b)
(p− h)λβ30
We can solve for α and θ as follows (recall uy and uo are taken as given) from the following equation:
µ
µ
θ1−φ
¶ 1
φ
=
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)− ¡aθ ¢ 1uy(1−λ)(1−b)
(p− h)λβ
Using the deÞnitions of X and n, this reduces to³µ
θ
´ 1
φ
θ +
n
θ
= X (32)
DeÞne
H(θ) ≡
³µ
θ
´ 1
φ
θ +
n
θ
This is the left hand side of (32). The following results are easy to show:
1.
lim
θ→0+
³µ
θ
´ 1
φ
θ =∞
This means that near θ = 0, the function H(.) starts oﬀ near ∞. Hence, θ = 0 is ruled out as
a solution. This proves that if there is any solution, it must have θ > 0.
2.
H 0(θ) =
1
φ
³µ
θ
´ 1
φ
−1µ−1
θ2
¶
θ +
³µ
θ
´ 1
φ
µ−n
θ2
¶
< 0
3. Recall that the right hand side of (32) is a constant. Then, a suﬃcient condition for a solution
to (32) be a positive fraction is that
H(θ = 1) < X
This would imply that there is an intersection between H(.) and X to the left of θ = 1. Recall
H(1) = µ
1
φ + n. Then, we have
µ
1
φ +
µ
a
(p− h)λβ
¶
1
uy (1− λ) (1− b) <
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ
or,
µ
1
φ <
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ −
µ
a
(p− h)λβ
¶
1
uy (1− λ) (1− b)
=
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)− auy(1−λ)(1−b)
(p− h)λβ
=
1
(p− h)λβ
·
(p− h)
(1− b) +
1
uy(1− b)
½
(p− h) uo − 1
(1− λ)
¾
+ β(s+ p)
¸
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Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for θ < 1 is that
µ
1
φ <
1
(p− h)λβ
·
(p− h)
(1− b) +
1
uy(1− b)
½
(p− h) uo − 1
(1− λ)
¾
+ β(s+ p)
¸
(33)
hold or µ
1
φ < X − n. So far, we have established a condition under which θ ∈ (0, 1) . We still
need to show that the corresponding α lies in (0, 1) .
4. One thing to note is that X > 1. To see this, write X as
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ =
h
1+ uouy
i
λβ(1− b) +
β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ| {z }
>0
Since
h
1+ uouy
i
> 1 and λβ(1− b) < 1, it follows that X > 1.
5. Recall from (32) that
α = X − n
θ
Notice that dαdθ > 0 and so the maximum value that α can take corresponds to the maximum
value that θ can take (which is 1). Then, a suﬃcient condition for α < 1 is that X < 1+ n.
6. Combining all these, we can say that there exists an unique equilibrium α and θ both positive
fractions if the following suﬃcient condition on parameters is satisÞed:
n+ µ
1
φ < X < 1+ n
In passing, notice that under this suﬃcient condition, α and θ are both positive fractions,
and that fact alone immediately implies that
uy =
1
2− α(1− b) ∈ (0, 1)
and
uo =
1− α(1− b)
2− α(1− b) ∈ (0, 1) .
D Proof of Lemma 4
In a steady state, the gains from hiring a young worker for the Þrm are given by p − h − wy +
bβΠv + (1− b)βΠf − βΠv. Using Πf = (p−weo) + βΠv, it follows that these gains may be written
as p − h − wy − β(1 − b)(1 − β)Πv + (1 − b)β(p − weo). The young workers surplus from Þnding
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employment is given by wy + bβJ
u
o + (1 − b)βJeo − βJuo which upon simpliÞcation yields wy +
β (1− b) s− β (1− b)αwuo + (1− b)βweo. Under non-symmetric bargaining,
(1−λ) [wy + β (1− b) s− β (1− b)αwuo + (1− b)βweo] = λ [p− h−wy − β(1− b)(1− β)Πv + (1− b)β(p−weo)]
must hold. This readily simpliÞes to
wy = λ (p− h) + λβ(1− b) [(p−weo)− (1− β)Πv]− (1− λ)β (1− b) [s− αwuo +weo]
which upon further simpliÞcation yields
wy = (p− h) [λ+ (1− λ)λβ (1− b)α]− β(1− b)(1− β)Πv − (1− λ)β (1− b) s.
When Π∗v = 0,
wy = λ (p− h) [1+ (1− λ)β (1− b)α]− (1− λ)β (1− b) s
holds.¥
E Proof of results in Table 1
Note that (13) can be written as
α = X − n
θ
.
An obvious necessary condition for α > 0 is
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ >
n
θ
which translates to a lower-bound restriction on θ :
θ >
n (p− h)λβ
(p−h)
(1−b)
h
1+ uouy
i
+ β(s+ p)
.
For α > 0, it is however suﬃcient that either
1
(1− b)λβ
µ
1+
uo
uy
¶
>
n
θ
(34)
or
β(s+ p)
(p− h)λβ >
n
θ
(35)
hold. Henceforth, we will maintain the suﬃcient conditions spelt out in (34) and (35). Now, from
(13):
α =
(p− h) + β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+ uo
uy
(p− h)−
µ
a
θ
¶
1
uy (1− λ)
(p− h)λβ (1− b)33
Then, the following are immediate:
∂α
∂a
= −
µ
1
θ
¶
1
uy (1− λ) (p− h)λβ (1− b) < 0
∂α
∂s
=
β(1− b)
(p− h)λβ (1− b) > 0
∂α
∂uo
=
1
uy
(p− h)
(p− h)λβ (1− b) > 0
∂θ
∂µ
=
1
1− φ
³µ
α
´ φ
1−φ
µ
1
α
¶
> 0
∂θ
∂φ
= θ ln
³µ
α
´ 1
(1− φ)2 > 0
The following are also easy to verify:
∂α
∂β
=
1
β
n
θ
−
³
1+ uouy
´
(1− b)λβ
 < 0 by (34).
∂α
∂h
=
1
p− h
·
(s+ p)
(p− h)λ −
n
θ
¸
> 0 by (35).
∂α
∂λ
=
X
λ
+
n
θ
1− 2λ
λ (1− λ) > 0 if λ < 0.5
∂α
∂b
=
1
(1− b)2

³
1+ uouy
´
λβ
− n
θ
 is of ambiguous sign.
∂α
∂p
=
1
p− h
·
n
θ
− (s+ h)
(p− h)λ
¸
is of ambiguous sign.
∂α
∂uy
=
1
uy
·
n
θ
− uo
uy
1
(1− b)λβ
¸
is of ambiguous sign.
F Proof of Lemma 1
In a steady state with free entry, Πv = 0 holds. This implies
a = θuy(p− h−wy) + θuy(1− b)β(p−weo) + θuo(p− h−wuo ) (36)
Since
wuo = λ (p− h)
weo = λp
34
and
wy = λ (p− h) [1+ (1− λ)β (1− b)α]− (1− λ)β (1− b) s
holds, (36) implies
a = θuy(p− h−wy) + θuy(1− b)β(p− λp) + θuo(p− h− [λ (p− h)])
which after simpliÞcation yields,
a
θ
1
uy
= (p− h−wy) + (1− λ) (1− b)βp+ uo
uy
(p− h) (1− λ) (37)
Using the expression for wy reveals
p− h−wy = p− h− λ (p− h) [1+ (1− λ)β (1− b)α] + β(1− b)(1− λ)s
= (p− h) [(1− λ) {1− λβ (1− b)α}] + β(1− b)(1− λ)s
Then, it follows from (37) that
a
θ
1
uy
= (p− h) [(1− λ) {1− λβ (1− b)α}] + β(1− b)(1− λ)s+ (1− λ) (1− b)βp+ uo
uy
(p− h) (1− λ)
= (1− λ)
·
(p− h) {1− λβ (1− b)α}+ β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+ uo
uy
(p− h)
¸
and so, ³a
θ
´ 1
uy (1− λ) = (p− h) {1− λβ (1− b)α}+ β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+
uo
uy
(p− h) (38)
holds. Rearranging (38) yields (13).
G Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that uy =
1
2−α(1−b) , and uo =
1−α(1−b)
2−α(1−b) . Using these in (38), we get³a
θ
´ 1
uy (1− λ) =
a
θ
{2− α(1− b)}
(1− λ) = [(p− h) {1− λβ (1− b)α}+ β(1− b)s+ (1− b)βp+ [1− α(1− b)] (p− h
= (p− h) {2− α (1− b) (λβ + 1)}+ β(1− b)(s+ p).
It follows that
a
θ
{2− α(1− b)}
(1− λ) − (p− h) {2− α (1− b) (λβ + 1)} = β(1− b)(s+ p)
Collecting terms involving α, we get
2a
θ (1− λ) −
a(1− b)
θ (1− λ)α+ (1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h)α = β(1− b)(s+ p) + 2 (p− h)35
or, ·
a(1− b)
(1− λ)
¸³α
θ
´
− [(1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h)]α = 2a
θ (1− λ) − β(1− b)(s+ p)− 2 (p− h)
from where it follows that
α =
2a
θ (1− λ) − β(1− b)(s+ p)− 2 (p− h)
a(1− b)
θ (1− λ) − (1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h)
.
¥
H Proof of Lemma 2
For convenience, rewrite (16) and (15) as
θ =
a
(1− λ)
2− α(1− b)
β(1− b)(s+ p) + (p− h)[2− α(1− b)(1+ λβ) (39)
and
θ =
h µ
αφ
i 1
1−φ
. (40)
It is easy to check that (from (40))
dθ
dα
= − φ
1− φ
θ
α
< 0.
Also,
lim
α→0
h µ
αφ
i 1
1−φ
=∞ lim
α→∞
h µ
αφ
i 1
1−φ
= 0
So, the θ - locus starts oﬀ near ∞ and is downward-sloping and eventually goes to zero. The Þrst
condition we need for an intersection between (39) and (40) in the (0,1) range is that
lim
α→1
h µ
αφ
i 1
1−φ
< 1⇔ µ < 1.
Then, if we additionally satisÞed the restriction that
lim
α→1
a
(1− λ)
2− α(1− b)
β(1− b)(s+ p) + (p− h)[2− α(1− b)(1+ λβ) > limα→1
h µ
αφ
i 1
1−φ
we would have ensured that there was at least one intersection between (39) and (40) in the (0,1)
range. ¥
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I Proof of Lemma 3
When φ = 0.5, then (16) implies θ∗ = µ
2
α∗ . Then, (15) implies
α =
2aα
(1− λ)µ2 − β(1− b)(s+ p)− 2 (p− h)
a(1− b)α
(1− λ)µ2 − (1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h)
. (41)
It is easily checked that (41) reduces to
α2
a(1− b)
(1− λ)µ2 − α (1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h) =
2aα
(1− λ)µ2 − β(1− b)(s+ p)− 2 (p− h)
which simpliÞes to
α2
a(1− b)
(1− λ)µ2 − α
·
2aα
(1− λ)µ2 + (1− b) (λβ + 1) (p− h)
¸
+ β(1− b)(s+ p) + 2 (p− h) = 0.
Further simpliÞcation yields the desired quadratic.¥
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